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The Journal of Psychiatry & Law 27IFail-Winter 1999
Factitious disorders and
trauma-related diagnoses
BY DANIEL BROWN, PH.D.
AND ALAN W. SCREFLIN, J.D., M.A., LL.M.
373
The recent plethora of lawsuits involving allegations of 
iatrogenically implanted memories of satanic ritual abuse and 
other traumas has highlighted the existence of a unique group of 
psychiatric patients. Although these patients are often successful at
deceiving therapists (and sometimes juries), the case studies in this
special issue reveal the chronic nature of their propensity to invent
traumatic identities and past histories. The core clinical features of 
affect dysregulation, somatization, and impaired object relations,
together with frequent histories of alcohol and substance abuse,
parallel the psychiatric co-morbidity frequently found in genuine
trauma victims. These case studies also point to early childhood
problems in attachment, and sometimes to real childhood trauma, 
as possible etiologic factors. The current diagnostic system
does not adequately capture thefull range of these patients'
psychopathology, which involves the creation of factitious identities
and fictional traumatic personal histories. The particulars of these
histories change over time as the patients incorporate, deliberately
and/or "unconsciously," details derived from outside sources.
Although clearly susceptible to being influenced by authority
figures of all kinds, it is evidentfrom these case studies that the
core psychopathology at work here is intrinsic to the patients and 
not the by-product of therapeutic misadventure.
@ 2000 by Federal Legal Publications, Inc.
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374 FACTITIOUS DISORDERS & TRAUMA-RELATED DIAGNOSES
The prevalence rates of psychological forms of factitious dis­
orders and the appearance of more complex forms of psycho­
logical factitious disorders have increased significantly in the
1 980s and 1 990s. Case reports of factitious illness in the
1 960s and 1970s were mainly limited to the fabrication of
physical symptoms, and in the 1 970s and 1 980s also to the
simulation of a single psychiatric illness, such as factitious
depression. In the 1980s and 1990s there emerged more com­
plex forms of psychological factitious illness that entail not
only the simulation of one or more psychiatric conditions­
typically posttraumatic stress disorder and dissociative iden­
tity disorder-but also the s imu l ation of elaborately
fabricated personal histories and identities, including, at
times, highly exaggerated and bizarre histories such as those
involving ritual abuse. Even more recently still other new
forms have emerged, such as factitious false memory syn­
drome in the context of malpractice litigation. The current
diagnostic nomenclature is inadequate in that it fails to
address these complex forms of factitious disorder; thus clini­
cians and forensic experts do not have the conceptual tools
and detection skills to correctly identify complex forms of
factitious behavior typically associated with trauma-related
diagnoses. This paper was written, as were the rest of the arti­
cles in this special issue of The Journal of Psychiatry & Law,
to fill that void.
1. The history of factitious disorders
Factitious disorder first appeared as a diagnosis in the third
edition of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Dis­
orders, DSM-III, published in 1 980. A person with a facti­
tious disorder voluntarily feigns symptoms of some illness in
order to derive the attention accompanying the "sick role."
Despite attempts to clarify the parameters of this rather
new diagnostic entity in the successive versions of DSM-III-R
and DSM-IV, factitious disorder patients remain "a poorly
understood group of people."1
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Modern study of factitious disorders began in 1 934 with Karl
Menninger's collection of case histories of patients suffering
from "polysurgery. addiction."2 In 1 95 1  Asher coined the term
"Munchausen's syndrome," after a German baron well known
for telling fantastic tales. Asher defined Munchausen's syn­
drome as an "acute [fabricated] illness supported by a plausi­
ble and dramatic history." He characterized the condition in
terms of an "intense desire to deceive everybody as much as
possible . . .  based [on a] desire to be the centre of interest
and attention." According to Asher, the medical report of the
Munchausen's patient is "largely made up of falsehoods and
fantasy," and the most remarkable feature of the illness is its
senselessness."3 Bursten was the first to attempt an early clin­
ical description of the disorder. Such patients embark on a
"life perpetually in search of hospitalization and instrumenta­
tion." He described three major features of the condition: (1)  
a dramatic presentation of one or more medical complaints;
(2) pseudologia fantastica, or falsely elaborating symptoms
and histories; and (3) "wandering" from clinic to clinic and
from doctor to doctor. Bursten emphasized that such patients
essentially are "imposters," who defend against a sense of
inferiority by avoiding their true identity and by assuming
false roles:'
Despite these early formulations, factitious illness was rarely
diagnosed in the 1 960s. Only 12 cases of Munchausen's syn­
drome were reported in the literature before 1 960, and by
1 968 the number had risen to only 36. Most of these cases
pertained to feigning medical conditions.s 
In 1 968 Spiro reviewed 38 cases of factitious illness. He saw
Munchausen's syndrome as a specific type of factitious ill­
ness characterized by a chronic, unremitting course over
time. Spiro emphasized that despite their fabrication of
largely medical symptoms, these patients are best given a pri­
mary psychiatric diagnosis.6 Other clinicians since Spiro have
likewise emphasized the psychiatric nature of this condition. '
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376 FACTITIOUS DISORDERS & TRAUMA-RELATED DIAGNOSES
The number of case reports of factitious illness increased in
the 1 970s and 1 980s. Reich and Gottfried described case
reports of 41 factitious patients seen at a Boston hospital
from between 1 970 and 1980.S Folks and Freeman reported
on 28 cases seen between 1 980 and 1 985.9 Prevalence rates
for the condition have been estimated at 0.2%-0.8 %  of
patients, with estimates of up to 1 0% for factitious fever
reports. 10
The types of medical illnesses feigned by factitious disorder
patients are as diverse as the disease itself,1I and it is conceiv­
able that factitious behavior can occur for almost any physio­
logical system in the body.12 Some attempts have been made
to categorize factitious medical manifestations into subtypes,
such as self-induced infections, simulated medical illnesses,
chronic wounds, and surreptitious self-medication.13 More
recently, factitious cancerl4 and factitious AIDSIS have
become more popular.
Historically, it remains true that the majority of traditional
cases of factitious illness pertain to feigning medical condi­
tions.1 6 However, the past several decades have been charac­
terized by a remarkable increase in factitious psychiatric
conditions. 17 Here again, the possible psychiatric manifesta­
tions of factitious illness are so diverse that they are hard
to classify. Common forms of factitious psychiatric illness
reported in the literature included factitious depression and
grief;ls factitious psychosis and schizophrenia; 19 factitious neu­
rological conditions, e.g., epilepsy;20 and feigned aIcoholism.21 
The classification of factitious disorders gets even more com­
plicated due to reports of a co-existence of factitious physical
and psychological symptoms22 and also because of the co­
existence of factitious and genuine psychiatric conditions,
typically eating disorders and alcoholism, in the s ame
patient.23 A history of chemical dependency is strongly asso­
ciated with the subsequent development of a factitious condi­
tion.24 
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2. Clinical features of factitious disorder
A factitious disorder is best defined as an "artificial produc­
tion or simulation of a disease [or history] ."25 Like malinger­
ing, factitious behavior involves deliberate deception and
often intentional self-harm.26 Symptoms are dramatically pre­
sented, and the production of symptoms and/or histories is
exaggerated when the patient is being observed. According to 
Folks and Freeman, the three essential clinical features
include pathological lying, recurrent simulated illnesses, and
wandering from clinic to clinic assuming a sick role. Support­
ing evidence includes borderline or antisocial personality
traits, childhood deprivation, equivocal results from diverse
diagnostic and treatment procedures, evidence of self-induced
symptoms, knowledge of the medical field, multiple hospital­
izations, mUltiple scars, a police record, and a dramatic pre­
sentation.27 
Similarly, Ireland et al. described the essential clinical fea­
tures as simulated dramatic illness; spurious signs of disease
produced by self-mutilation or drug abuse; mUltiple hospital­
izations; pathological lying; aggressive, disruptive, or evasive
behavior; and premature discharge against medical advice.28 
Multiple patient identities in the same patient over time are
quite common,2 9 as is a chronic unremitting course.30 
Some experts have described a continuum of simulating dis­
orders. Cramer et aI., for example, see malingering, factitious
disorder and somatoform disorder along a continuum.3)
Nadelson, likewise, has described a continuum of simulation,
ranging from abnormal illness behavior (malingering and fac­
titious behavior), somatization, conversion disorders, psy­
chogenic pain disorder, hypochondriasis, and patients with
"real" illnesses.32
Dworkin and Caligor describe a three-dimensional model
used to distinguish a factitious disorder from related condi­
tions: symptoms (physical vs. psychological); production of
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378 FACTITIOUS DISORDERS & TRAUMA-RELATED DIAGNOSES
symptoms (voluntary vs. involuntary); and motivation (con­
scious vs.  unconscious) . Unlike malingering, factitious
behavior is characterized by unconsciously motivated behav­
ior, and unlike somatization disorder, factitious behavior is
characterized by voluntary production of symptoms. 33 
Furthermore, patients engaging in factitious behavior can do
so at different "levels of enactment." At the lower level the
patient simply reports false symptoms. At an intermediate
level the report is accompanied by simulation behavior. At
the higher level of enactment the patient actually creates the
illness through self-inflicted, symptom-producing behaviors.34 
Most experts agree that the basic motivation associated with
factitious illness is the compulsive need to assume a sick role
in order to get attention or care-taking. In fact, "this goal of
obtaining care differentiates factitious illness from other self­
destructive behaviors." 35 However, patients may also engage
in factitious behavior to avoid responsibility and to deflect
from disappointments in life.36 
One unresolved issue is the extent to which factitious behav­
ior is voluntary or involuntary. Most experts agree that the
simulation of symptoms and/or fabrication of a history is vol­
untary behavior, while the motivation to adopt a sick role is
largely involuntary. While the creation of fabricated symp­
toms may be voluntary, and the patient is aware of producing
false symptoms, the patient actively tries to keep such simu­
lation a secret. However, since factitious behavior essentially
is deception, it can entail self-deception in addition to other
deception, so that such behavior, although voluntarily pro­
duced, nevertheless may not be fully in awareness. Further­
more, it is not always easy to differentiate between conscious
and unconscious production and motivationY
  
   
  
  
   
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
  
   
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
  
   
 
        
  
 
 
      
   
 
     
    
    
     
      
     
       
      
   
    
      
   
       
   
     
       
       
      
        
     
       
        
    
         
         
          
 
 
      
         
           
        
3. Refining the factitious disorder diagnosis­
"hysteria split asunder"
379
The concept of a factitious disorder diagnosis came from a
classic paper titled "Hysteria Split Asunder" published in
1 978, just before DSM-III replaced the previous DSM-II.38 In
that paper Hyler and Spitzer made the point that the DSM-II
concept of "hysteria," much like the idea of "insanity," was
over-inclusive, diagnostically imprecise, and difficult to test
empirically. They believed that "hysteria" could be divided
conceptually into a variety of discrete subgroups, and that
well-defined criteria could be established for each of these
unique diagnostic entities. In essence, "hysteria" was split
into four individual categories and then eliminated as a
generic category from DSM-III: histrionic personality disor­
der (Axis II); somatoform disorders (Axis I); dissociative dis­
orders (Axis I); and factitious disorder (Axis I). According to 
this new classification, conversion disorder became a subtype
of the generic somatoform disorders category, and somato­
form and dissociative disorders were separated from each
other, the former pertaining to physical symptoms and the lat­
ter to mental symptoms (with respect to consciousness, iden­
tity and memory) . Factitious disorders were differentiated
from somatoform disorders based on the voluntary produc­
tion of physical symptoms in the former group as compared
with an involuntary report of physical symptoms in the latter
group. Like malingering, factitious disorders are voluntarily
produced forms of deception. Unlike malingering, factitious
disorders are not obviously linked to environmental goals,
such as monetary gain.
In this new system, factitious disorder appeared as a genuinely
new diagnosis. The basic idea was to delineate the dissimu­
lating feature of hysteria as a separate diagnostic entity in its
own right.39 With this new factitious disorder diagnosis, the
idea that certain patients might engage in systematic, planned
deception of their doctors, not for monetary gain but for purely
psychological reasons, reached a new level of legitimacy.
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380 FACTITIOUS DISORDERS & TRAUMA-RELATED DIAGNOSES
4. Factitious disorder in the editions of the DSM
DSM-III (1980) was the first edition of the DSM to include
the diagnosis of factitious disorder as a new type of dissimu­
lating disorder. According to the DSM-III, the following cri­
teria are used for a factitious disorder:
A. Plausible presentation of physical symptoms that are appar­
ently under the individual's voluntary control to such a
degree that there are multiple hospitalizations.
B. The individual's goal is apparently to assume the "patient"
role and is not otherwise understandable in light of the indi­
vidual's environmental circumstances.40 
These criteria emphasize the voluntary production of symp­
toms, motivated by a desire to assume the sick role. The
caveat "not otherwise understandable in light of the individ­
ual's environmental circumstances" was meant to underscore
the importance of differentiating between malingering and
factitious behavior. DSM-III also explicitly defines Mun­
chausen's syndrome as a chronic form of a factitious disorder
pertaining mainly to physical symptoms.
One of the striking features of these DSM-III criteria is that
little emphasis is given to factitious psychological conditions
(or to atypical forms of factitious disorder). Although DSM­
III sets up a separate category for psychological factitious
symptoms, such symptoms are considered quite rare (e.g.,
Ganser's syndrome).41
Several years later the DSM-IIIR defined the criteria for facti­
tious disorder in the following manner:
A. Intentional production or feigning of physical [or psychologi­
cal] symptoms.
B. A psychological need to assume the sick role, as evidenced by
the absence of external incentives for the behavior, such as
economic gain, better care, or physical well-being.
C. Occurrence not exclusively during the course of another Axis
I disorder, such as schizophrenia.42 
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3 8 1  
Thus several modifications appear i n  the DSM-IIIR that are
not found in the original 1 980 criteria. In the DSM-IIIR, the
meaning of "voluntary control" is more carefully defined as
"deliberate and purposeful (intentional)," but not necessarily
under the patient's control. Such control may be deliberate
but also "have a compulsive quality."43 The DSM-IIIR also
makes more explicit the lack of external incentives operative
in factitious behavior, as compared with malingering. A facti­
tious disorder differs from malingering on the basis of an
intrapsychic need. Because many more cases of factitious
psychological symptoms had been reported in the literature in
the early 1980s, DSM-IIIR also keeps the DSM demarcation
between factitious physical and factitious psychological
symptoms, but it gives greater definition to the boundaries
between each of these categories.44 
The exclusionary rules of these DSM-IIIR criteria are very
interesting. Generally speaking, a factitious disorder diagno­
sis is not given if another (real) Axis I psychiatric condition
is present (e.g., C. "Occurrence not exclusively during the
course of another Axis I disorder, such as schizophrenia." But
see elsewhere, "The presence of factitious physical or psy­
chological symptoms does not preclude the coexistence of
true physical or psychological symptoms").4S Thus the diag­
nosis of a factitious disorder is made very conservatively in
the presence of a real Axis I psychiatric condition, and DSM­
IIIR clearly downplays the possibility of co-existing facti­
tious behavior and a real Axis I condition. However, a
factitious disorder diagnosis is not made exclusive of an Axis
II diagnosis or of substance abuse, so that it clearly is possi­
ble to have factitious behavior co-existing with a personality
disorder diagnosis under DSM-IIIR definitions.
The DSM-IV currently defines a factitious disorder as
follows: 
A. Intentional production or feigning of physical or psychologi­
cal signs or symptoms.
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382 FACTITIOUS DISORDERS & TRAUMA-RELATED DIAGNOSES
B. The motivation for the behavior is a psychological need to
assume the sick role.
C. An absence of external incentives . . . the behavior is not
better accounted for by another Axis I or Axis II disorder
(e.g., not in response to command hallucinations, not a conse­
quence of a suicide attempt).46 
The distinction between factitious disorders with predomi­
nantly physical symptoms and those with predominantly psy­
chological signs and symptoms is preserved from DSM-lIIR.
However, DSM-IIIR uses separate criteria for factitious disor­
der with physical symptoms and for factitious disorder with
psychological symptoms. DSM-IVuses a single generic set of
criteria for factitious disorder, and it lists physical, psycho­
logical, and mixed factitious forms as sUbtypes.47 This repre­
sents a conceptual improvement, in that use of the current
criteria contains an appreciation that factitiousness can take a
variety of forms. DSM-IValso contains a "parsimony clause"
in that a factitious disorder diagnosis is not recommended if
the symptoms can be accounted for by another Axis I or Axis
II disorder.48 Unfortunately this type of thinking, as we will
see later, makes it difficult to detect cases in which factitious
behavior co-exists with genuine psychiatric illnesses.
Another important change in DSM-IV is the recommendation
of a new type of factitious disorder not otherwise specified,
factitious disorder by proxy, the details of which are included
in a list of empirically derived research diagnostic criteria.49 
In the international diagnostic nomenclature, ICD-lO, facti­
tious disorders are included under Section F6, Disorders of
Adult Personality and Behavior:
FD F68.1 Intentional production or feigning of symptoms or dis­
abilities either physical or psychological (factitious disorder).
A. A persistent pattern of intentional production or feigning of
symptoms andlor self-infliction of wounds in order to produce
symptoms in the absence of a confirmed physical or mental
disorder.
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B. No evidence can be found for an external motivation (such as
financial compensations, escape from danger, more medical
care, etc.). If such evidence can be found, category Z (malin­
gering) should be used. (World Health Organization, 1990, p. 
368)50 
While fCD-fO maintains the basic notion of factitiousness as
a simulation disorder as found in the DSM classifications, it
does not include anything about assuming a sick role, and it
rejects the idea of an unconscious motivation. Furthermore,
factitious disorders as defined by the fCD-fO are much more
closely aligned to personality disorders than in the DSM 
interpretation.
5. Diagnostic criticism
a. The
problem of
establishing
motivation
While the basic intention of creating a new DSM diagnosis of
factitious disorder so as to delineate a disease of deliberate
deception based on psychological needs is admirable, the
enterprise has been somewhat ill conceived. Well-designed
systematic field trials of the new diagnosis have not yet been
conducted, and most of the published literature on the disor­
der still consists mainly of case reports.51 Interrater reliability
of the diagnosis (kappa coefficients) remain unacceptably
low-lower than most other DSM diagnoses.52 In part, the
problem stems from the fact that the conceptual basis for the
disorder and its specific diagnostic criteria are not very
clearly delineated. According to critics, "the rationale that
underlies and informs the diagnostic criteria for factitious
disorder is, at present, logically indefensible and empirically
unfounded."53 A number of problems with the diagnostic cat­
egory have been identified.
Ultimately the clinician has to make a subjective judgment
about whether the deceptive behavior is voluntary or involun­
tary, and whether or not it is motivated by an unconscious
need to assume a sick role. According to Rogers et al.:
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384 FACTITIOUS DISORDERS & TRAUMA-RELATED DIAGNOSES
b. The
problem of
diagnostic
boundaries­
exclusion,
inclusion,
overlap &
co-existing
conditions
Motivation (conscious or unconscious, voluntary or involuntary) is 
the determining factor in the diagnosis of factitious disorder with
psychological symptoms. . . .
Furthermore, the voluntary aspect of its clinical presentation, the
pivotal aspect of factitious disorder, remains unresolved and contro­
versial.54 
Many experts concur that making such a determination is not
always easy or always possible.55 Utilization of countertrans­
ference reactions is not a reliable way to make the diagno­
sis.5 6 The problem is further complicated by the fact that
simulation behavior in a given factitious disorder patient may
arise from very diverse and conflicting motives within the
same patient.57 Based on the unreliability of such subjective
judgments, some experts have recommended that the clini­
cian sidestep the determination of motivation entirely and
make the diagnosis based on the deceptively produced signs
and symptoms alone:
Therefore, an appropriate strategy might be to set aside the slippery
question of what is conscious and what is voluntary, and concen­
trate on the objective features of patients displaying factitious signs
or symptoms.58 
Irrespective of the determination of voluntary/involuntary
and conscious/unconscious motivation, the bottom line
remains: a systematic pattern of deceptively produced symp­
toms and/or history.
Rogers et al. have criticized the lack of conceptual clarity
with respect to exclusion and inclusion criteria in making a
factitious disorder diagnosis. They believe this diagnosis
"does not appear to satisfy the requirements for a mental dis­
order of inclusion, exclusion, and outcome criteria." They
further point out that many patients with factitious behavior
have concurrent real Axis I psychiatric conditions, and that
patients with Axis II diagnoses, notably borderlines, can cer­
tainly rival a purely factitious disorder patient in the variabil­
ity and simulation of symptoms. Furthermore, other
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syndromes exist that also entail deliberately produced symp­
toms such as nail-biting, cuticle-picking, hair-pulling,
anorexia or bulimia, and self-mutilation. S ome question
remains as to how such conditions are and are not similar to a
factitious disorder.5 9 According to Rogers et aI., such overlap
with other conditions "calls into question the soundness of
diagnosing factitious disorder in the presence of such a disor­
der [like borderline] ." 60 
On the other hand, many experts have avoided the issue of
diagnostic overlap altogether; they make the diagnosis of fac­
titious disorder only in the absence of any other real psychi­
atric condition. Certainly this approach is given support by
the passage in the DSM-IIIR that states that "occurrence not
exclusively during the course of another Axis I disorder, such
as schizophrenia."61 Supporting this view, Sutherland and
Rodin emphasize that the diagnosis of factitious disorder "is
often a diagnosis of exclusion." 62
An additional complication is the variability and heterogene­
ity within the domain of patients diagnosed with a factitious
disorderY For example, DSM-IIIR and DSM-IV arbitrarily
divide factitious disorders into three subcategories: physical,
psychological, and not otherwise specified. The problem with
adopting such categories is that many contemporary factitious
disorder patients present with both psychological and physi­
cal symptoms.64 Not only has there been a recent remarkable
increase in factitious disorder patients with psychological
symptoms and mixed physical and psychological symptoms,
but there has also been a significant increase in factitiously
produced false histories and identities, both associated with,
and in the absence of, factitious symptoms. Such complex
factitious presentations help us to appreciate the many faces
of the disorder, the common core of which entails the need to
deceive in some way or another.
Another problem is the diagnostic overlap with other dissim­
ulating and hysteria-related conditions such as malingering,
  
  
 
  
 
 
  
  
  
 
    
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
   
  
 
  
    
  
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
   
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
  
  
  
 
  
    
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
   
  
 
 
 
 
  
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
      
  
  
    
 
 
 
  
  
   
     
   
  
  
     
    
       
      
       
    
        
 
      
      
         
       
      
 
        
       
     
 
  
        
    
       
         
         
      
         
      
386 FACTITIOUS DISORDERS & TRAUMA-RELATED DIAGNOSES 
somatoform disorders, and dissociative conditions. Somato­
form conditions can sometimes co-exist with malingering.
Sometimes the only clear distinction between a somatoform
disorder and factitiousness is the "sociopathic pattern" of
deception in the factitious disorder patient. 6s As we will see
later in this paper, the co-existence of a factitious disorder
and a dissociative disorder is increasingly common.
The factitious disorder patient who has deceived clinicians
for years may eventually sue a clinician for malpractice.
When such potential monetary gains enter into the equation
of systematic deceptive behavior, factitiousness and malin­
gering overlap.
The problem of the overlap between a factitious disorder and
other Axis I and Axis II conditions has yet to be resolved
adequately, and making the factitious disorder diagnosis at
the exclusion of real Axis I conditions ignores the clinical
observation that factitious behavior frequently is observed in
association with other Axis I and Axis II conditions. The co­
existence of factitious disorder and bipolar disorder has been
documented.66 The co-existence of factitious behavior and an
Axis II personality disorder is extremely well documented
across many studies, so much so that some experts have
advocated that factitious behavior should be seen as a subset
of borderline personality or a mixed personality disorder.67 
The most common types of personality disorders associated
with a factitious disorder diagnosis are borderline, narcissis­
tic, histrionic, and antisocial personality disorder.6 8 There is
also a strong association between factitious behavior and sub­
stance abuse and dependency.69
The relationship between factitious disorder and major disso­
ciative disorders has not been clarified. While the DSM-lIIR 
and the DSM-IV at least acknowledged the often clinically
observed association between factitious disorder and person­
ality disorder and substance abuse, DSM-IV failed to clarify
the interrelationship between factitious disorder and dissocia-
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c. Fusing
hysteria back
together
versus
diagnosing
co-morbidity
387
tive disorder. As Freyberger and Schneider said, "The phe­
nomenological and etiological relationship between factitious
disorder and borderline, acute transient and atypical psy­
chotic disorders, and dissociative states have to be included
in the . . .  diagnostic systems."70
Hyler and Spitzer's project of "splitting hysteria asunder"
was admirable in its goal of seeking greater conceptual clar­
ity, empirical reliability and validity for each of the four diag­
nostic entities into which hysteria was split. The problem
with this enterprise, however, is that it virtually ignores the
natural covariance between each of the four diagnostic enti­
ties. Given the increasing number of case reports and empiri­
cal studies that show an association between factitious
disorder on the one hand and various personality disorders
(such as borderline and histrionic personality), somatoform
disorders, and dissociative disorders on the other hand, the
interrelationship between these conditions, at least for certain
patients, cannot be ignored.
Kihlstrom's radical proposal to return to the archaic diagnosis
of hysteria views the attempt to split hysteria asunder as a
failure.71 However, fusing hysteria back together does not
adequately address the problems that necessitated the split in
the first place. Our more moderate proposal is that these four
diagnostic entities remain as discrete entities, but that diag­
nosticians and clinical researchers more adequately address
the degree to which these diagnoses co-vary, at least for cer­
tain patients. In other words, the DSM criteria should be
redrafted to allow explicitly for the fact that a factitious dis­
order may co-exist with a major dissociative disorder, a
somatoform disorder, and a personality disorder, and in at
least some patients two, three, or all four of these conditions
may occur as multiple co-morbid diagnoses. Multiple co­
morbid diagnoses of this nature are not uncommon in clinical
reality, and we believe that the co-morbidity position is a bet­
ter solution than Kihlstrom's fusion position or the DSM's
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d. Abnormal
illness
behavior 
exclusion position ("occurrence not exclusively during the
course of another Axis I disorder, such as schizophrenia.")72
Another reasonable solution to the problem of overlap
between factitious, personality, somatoform and dissociative
disorders is to drop the diagnosis of factitious disorder as a
discrete diagnostiC entity per se and, instead, to view facti­
tiousness as a type of "abnormal illness behavior" that may
co-exist with many types of genuine psychiatric disorders.
Pilowsky coined the term abnormal illness behavior (AlB),
in which the primary motivation is to adopt a sick role.
Pilowsky observed that some patients manifest illness behav­
ior in the absence of physical signs of illness or any sense of
pain or discomfort. Abnormal illness behavior occurs when
the "sick role is not appropriate to the objective pathology
observed."73 Carodoc-Davies stated succinctly: "More logi­
cally, these conditions can be viewed as dysfunctional behav­
iors, not nosological entities."74 Rogers et aI. take a similar
position: "Questions remain as to whether factitious disorder
with psychological symptoms is more of a symptom/syndrome
than a disorder."7S Other experts have viewed factitiousness
not as a discrete diagnostic entity, but as a form of illness
behavior strongly associated with a personality disorder.7 6 
Our position is that factitious illness behavior is definitely
seen in some personality-disordered patients, but is not so
limited. Factitious illness behavior can also sometimes be
found in association with somatoform and dissociative disor­
ders. One way to handle this interrelationship is to give a
diagnosis of a somatoform disorder with factitious features or
a dissociative disorder with factitious features. Whether pref­
erence is given to making joint co-morbid diagnoses or to an
Axis I diagnosis with factitious illness behavior features, in
either case the fundamental interrelationship between these
hysterialike diagnoses and factitious behavior is preserved.
Furthermore, in each case the primary motivation of simula­
tion or embellishment of a genuine Axis I disorder in the ser­
vice of care-eliciting behavior is emphasized.77 
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6. Factitious trauma-related illness behavior
a. Factitious
posttraumatic
stress
disorder
As the diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
became popularized in the era following the Vietnam War, a
new version of factitious behavior emerged in the 1 980s: fac­
titious PTSD. Sparr and Pankratz reported five cases of indi­
viduals alleging that they had PTSD as a result of combat
exposure in Vietnam. Three claimed to have been prisoners of
war. All five reported fabricated war stories along with simu­
lated posttraumatic stress symptoms. Eventually their decep­
tion was discovered; four of the five patients had never been
in Vietnam, and two had never been in the military at all.
Sparr and Pankratz concluded, "Factitious posttraumatic
stress disorder is yet another variation of the many clinical
deceptions that physicians may encounter." Each patient had
been "fairly convincing" to the doctors, yet "blatantly mis­
represented the facts."78 Some years later these same authors
described three additional cases. They concluded that
"factitious PTSD has not disappeared over time."79 Lynn
and B elza similarly reported seven cases of factitious
PTSD in the wake of media coverage of PTSD. While the
traditional factitious disorder patient with physical symptoms
engages in simulation behavior out of a need to adopt a
"sick role," Lynn and B elza emphasize that the individual
with factitious PTSD does so out of a need to achieve a
warrior or hero status. They conclude that factitious PTSD
is "not uncommon" as a consequence of the Vietnam conflict.
They emphasize that such an individual "had obviously
acquired sufficient knowledge of PTSD to develop a tale
best suited to his needs. The motives, however, varied in
each case."80 Currently, these findings are not infrequent,
and similar cases have appeared in the 1 990s.8 1  As other
international conflicts have received wide media exposure,
new versions of factitious PTSD have also been reported,
such as the factitious presentation of trauma following a fab­
ricated account of an IRA bombing in Northern Ireland. Once
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
   
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
           
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
   
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
        
    
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
    
     
  
          
    
  
 
        
        
         
    
 
      
        
     
      
          
        
  
         
        
        
          
          
        
            
            
        
           
  
390 FACTITIOUS DISORDERS & TRAUMA-RELATED DIAGNOSES 
b. Factitious
victimization:
fabrication of
personal
history
again the primary motivation was to get attention as a war
hero.82 
An important feature of factitious PTSD is the total fabrica­
tion of a fictitious trauma story in addition to the more tradi­
tional simulation of psychological symptoms of a
trauma-related disorder. Such cases make it clear that simula­
tion behavior is not at all restricted to faking symptoms of a
disorder, and that faking a personal history and identity is
equally important.
Feldman, Ford and Stone state:
Although patients with factitious disorders typically seek the
"patient" role through illness portrayals, some instead portray them­
selves falsely as "victims." [Victim status was achieved through
fabricated rape reports.] Yet none of the allegations was clearly dis­
proved.83 
This citation illustrates a growing awareness that some indi­
viduals fabricate a personal history of victimization more
than they fabricate symptoms, although such reports are often
accompanied by simulated rape-related symptoms. Feldman
et al. also note that patients most likely to develop false
reports of childhood abuse, rape, or other trauma have a "pre­
disposition to dissociation."84
Other detailed case accounts of factitious rape have been
reported in the literature. One patient with a borderline per­
sonality disorder diagnosis alleged two separate incidents of
fabricated rape along with the complaint that she could not
remember many details of the rapes. She later confessed to
fabricating the rape stories while undergoing a polygraph
test. In retrospect it became clear that she made up the rapes
in order to get attention from her doctor. "[S]he chose to meet
her emotional needs by seeking a close therapeutic relation­
ship with a physician who she felt would trust and not ques­
tion her."85 
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In a recent case report, a woman made a highly dramatic false 
allegation of a violent sexual assault. Later it became clear
that she had self-inflicted her wounds.86 Other cases of facti­
tious rape follow a similar trajectory.87 After presenting four
cases of factitious rape, Feldman et al. concluded that each
was "prompted by a search for nurturance."88
Factitious victimization is not restricted to rape reports, but
covers the entire gamut of trauma and abuse (for example,
see the cases described by Marmer in this issue). Fabricated
accounts of neglect and physical abuse have been reported.89 
False allegations of physical assault by a parent90 and fabri­
cated reports of being an adult survivor of childhood sexual
abuse have also appeared in the literature.91 Sometimes these
stories are extensive and bizarre in nature. For example,
Stone described a case of a young woman with "unverifiable
stories of a horrendous and constantly changing content."92
Coons and Grier described a 25-year-old woman with a fabri­
cated history of S atanic ritual abuse.93 Factitious sexual
harassment claims have also been studied. Although no 
objective evidence existed to verify the harassment charge,
these patients nevertheless felt victimized, and they were
"motivated to file factitious sexual harassment claims by a
need for external validation of their inner experiences."94
Factitious bereavement has also been reported-for example,
the fabricated loss of a fictitious twin, resulting in hospital­
ization.95 
The early literature on factitious behavior primarily pertained
to factitious physical symptoms. Only later did mental health
professionals come to appreciate the range of factitious psy­
chiatric conditions. Nevertheless, the DSM definition clearly
places its emphasis on factitious symptom production,
whether the symptoms are of a physical or a psychological
nature. The DSM definition does not give proper emphasis to
the range of factitious victim reports and personal histories,
  
  
 
  
     
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
 
 
  
   
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
   
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
        
      
   
 
 
  
 
 
 
     
      
         
 
    
     
     
 
       
       
       
       
   
 
   
       
      
     
     
      
        
        
       
      
        
       
      
        
     
          
           
         
392 FACTITIOUS DISORDERS & TRAUMA-RELATED DIAGNOSES
irrespective of whether or not they are accompanied by simu­
lated symptoms.
Conceptually, the seeds of understanding factitious victimiza­
tion are found in Bursten's term "pseudologia fantastica" dat­
ing back to the 1 950s.96 Yet DSM-III and subsequent editions
never picked up on this theme sufficiently to develop a cate­
gory of factitious personal history in general or of factitious
victimization in particular. Therefore most clinicians today
have not been provided with the appropriate conceptual tools
to detect factitious victim reports unless they are accompa­
nied by increasingly bizarre and inconsistent symptoms over
time. The underlying motivation of factitious victimization is
less about the adoption of a sick role and more about "the
wish to acquire victim status."97
We believe the prevalence of factitious victimization is
higher than is represented by the few scattered case reports in 
the literature. For example, textbooks frequently report the
well-known phenomenon of false confessions after major
crimes have been reported/8 and the topic is discussed in
Scheflin and Brown (this issue). There is increasing evidence
that a significant portion of the variance of contemporary
"false memory" cases are manifestations of factitious behav­
ior. False-memory recanters typically recover progressively
complex and sometimes bizarre abuse and ritual abuse mem­
ories in the context of psychotherapy. Sometime later they
retract the abuse reports as fabrications and sue the therapist
for malpractice. In these lawsuits they allege that the thera­
pist suggestively implanted false abuse memories. High, in
this issue, makes the point that the currently dominant expla­
nation for retracted childhood abuse reports previously
reported by adults in psychotherapy is the iatrogenic hypoth­
esis: that the allegedly false childhood abuse reports were
"implanted" through unduly suggestive therapeutic influ­
ences. He shows that a plausible alternative explanation for at
least a portion of these recanted stories is that both the
embellished abuse report to the therapist and the embellished
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identity
disorder and
other
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recanted report to attorneys are a form of factitious behavior.
This behavior is motivated by a need for attention-first from
the defendant therapist and then from the plaintiff attorney
and the court. This thesis has historical support.99 Marmer
(this issue) presents several case studies in which factitious
disorder and malingering co-existed within the same patients.
He demonstrates that the traditional distinction between facti­
tious disorder and malingering, in terms of primary and sec­
ondary gain, isn't  that clear-cut, and that some patients
fabricate symptoms and trauma stories out of both a need for
attention and a wish for financial gain from lawsuits.
Factitious amnesia, often associated with a variety of neuro­
logical and physical complaints, has been reported.1oo Facti­
tious presentation of a major dissociative disorder, such as
dissociative identity disorder (DID) and dissociative disorder
not otherwise specified (DDNOS), has also been discussed
recently. Coons was the first to describe cases of factitious
DID. In 1978 he observed that some hospitalized psychiatric
inpatients who had not been diagnosed with MPD developed
MPD-like symptoms after exposure to genuine MPD patients
on the unit. He called this phenomenon "pseudomultiplic­
ity."101 In 1987 Kluft described six cases of likely simulated
MPD associated with criminal proceedings. He compared
these with 46 genuine MPD cases according to a set of malin­
gering criteria. He found that all 46 genuine MPD patients
shared two or more indicators of malingering with the likely
malingered MPD cases, so that traditional indicators of
malingering did not adequately discriminate between genuine
and malingered MPD. However, clinical criteria could be
used to distinguish between the two groups because those
with malingered MPD symptoms produced stereotyped, exag­
gerated, and inconsistent alter behavior over time as com­
pared with genuine MPD patients. The malingered MPD
symptoms were not convincing, and such patients showed no
prior history of dividedness.I02 In 1991 Chu observed:
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394 FACTITIOUS DISORDERS & TRAUMA-RELATED DIAGNOSES
With the increasing availability of information concerning MPD in
the media, in the scientific literature, and through patient networks
and self-help groups, the possibility and incidence of deliberate
simulation of MPD is increasing. Although this problem appears to
be more frequent in malingering, i.e., in a forensic setting where the
motivation is obvious, it is also appearing in the non-forensic clini­
cal setting as a factitious disorder.103 
He added, "The deliberate and realistic simulation of MPD
over a brief period of time is not difficult."I04 However, clini­
cal detection of faked MPD is at times difficult, especially
because of the overlap between genuine and simulated MPD
on malingering indices. Chu discussed two cases, the first of
a "relatively obvious" case of malingered MPD in the context
of legal proceedings, and the second of factitious MPD that
required "an extended period of evaluation prior to accurate
diagnosis [of factitious MPD]."I05 Chu's discussion illustrates
two important points: ( 1 ) Factitious MPD in the clinical set­
ting is far more difficult to detect than malingered MPD in
the legal arena; (2) Between the time of Kluft's 1987 obser­
vations and Chu's 1991 observations, "patients with factitious
MPD had become considerably more sophisticated in their
simulation of MPD symptomotology; thus, the differentiation
from genuine MPD was much more difficult and time con­
suming."I06 
Coons and Milstein107 conducted the first scientific study
comparing genuine and simulated MPD. They reviewed data
on 1 12 patients consecutively admitted to a psychiatric inpa­
tient hospital specializing in the treatment of dissociative dis­
orders. They found that 1 0 1  had been diagnosed with genuine
MPD and another 1 1  (10%) were found to have either facti­
tious or malingered MPD. These 1 1  simulating MPD patients
were compared with 50 genuine MPD patients along a num­
ber of dimensions such as demographics, response to psycho­
logical testing, and clinical features. Although simulating and
genuine MPD patients did not differ statistically in most
demographic variables or psychological testing, or in the
presence of many clinical features typically associated with
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MPD (such as the presence of alters, inter-alter dialogues,
amnestic barriers, disremembered experiences, changes in
handwriting and abilities, and reports of physical and sexual
abuse), there were two essential differences. First, with
respect to dissociative features, the simulators showed signif­
icantly fewer mood alterations and manifested depressed and
angry alter personality behavior significantly less than gen­
uine MPD patients. The genuine MPD patients manifested
sexual desire disorders significantly more frequently than did
the simulators. The simulators also showed more symptoms
associated with personality disorders--e.g., substance abuse,
self-mutilation, suicidality, and somatization-than did the
genuine MPD patients. Co-consciousness between alters was
significantly less likely in simulated MPD patients as com­
pared with genuine MPD patients. Second, those with facti­
tious or malingered MPD had significantly more features
characteristic of simulation disorders than did the genuine
MPD patients:
Of the eight symptoms or behaviors characteristic of factitious dis­
order or malingering which were inquired about in the original
study (la belle indifference, exaggeration, persistent lying, pseu­
dologia fantastica, selective amnesia, lack of consistent w ork
history, refusal of collateral interviews, legal problems, and exces­
sively dramatic behavior), all were increased and significantly dif­
ferent from the patients with genuine MPD . . . . Lack of prior
dissociation, seeking hospitalization and MPD diagnoses appeared
in all of the simulators. Inconsistent symptom presentations and
worsening of symptoms while under observation also characterized
the simulator groUp.IOS 
It is interesting to note that there were no significant differ­
ences between simulating and genuine MPD patients in
reports of physical and sexual abuse histories. Qualitatively,
these histories were typically much more dramatically pre­
sented and exaggerated by the simulators than by the genuine
MPD patients, and the simulators were likely to refuse collat­
eral interviews that might have exposed the simulation.
Coons and Milstein emphasize that the kind of factitious
MPD seen in the early 1 990s was much more difficult to
    
    
 
   
 
   
  
 
 
       
   
  
   
   
  
  
   
 
 
 
  
   
 
  
 
   
 
  
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
   
 
 
   
  
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
  
  
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
   
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
    
  
 
   
  
       
  
 
     
     
   
  
    
 
   
    
     
  
 
  
   
      
     
      
    
        
        
      
     
     
        
          
           
        
        
        
            
            
         
         
           
         
396 FACTITIOUS DISORDERS & TRAUMA-RELATED DIAGNOSES
detect than the more obvious reported cases of malingered
MPD reported by Kluft in the 1 980s:
Although some simulated cases of MPD may be quite obvious,
other cases may be extremely difficult to discern, even for an expe­
rienced clinician. . . . The clinician must look, rather, for the signs
characteristic of factitious disorder or malingering. These include
chronic severe disability since late adolescence, lack of a consistent
work history, dramatic and exaggerated presentation of symptoms,
pseudologia fantastica, demanding and deprecating attitudes
towards health care providers, refusal of collateral examinations,
selective amnesia, and hospital seeking behavior, and in the case of
factitious disorder, a psychological need to assume the sick role.I09 
In an earlier paper, Coons and Grier elaborate on the concept
of factitious victimization. Through a single case study they
illustrate the factitious presentation of a Satanic ritual abuse
history along with simulated MPD symptoms.110 The patient,
a 25-year-old woman, manifested regressive, childlike states
for which she claimed amnesia. She was given the diagnosis
of PTSD and MPD. Memory processing included frequent
attempts at abreaction, to which the patient failed to respond.
Then she reported a progressively complex ritual abuse his­
tory, including allegations of 1 5-20 pregnancies. She also
reported that Satanic symbols had been carved on her body,
but she refused a medical examination that might have cor­
roborated her report. She did not show PTSD symptoms upon
careful observation, and a subsequent physical examination
failed to reveal the alleged Satanic carvings. When con­
fronted about these inconsistencies, she altered her story to fit
the data. A later careful review of her history "revealed lying,
stealing, and runaway behavior during her pre-teen years,
unproven accusations of paternal incest at age fifteen, and
withdrawal from school in the eleventh grade. The accusa­
tions of incest began in the late 1 970s, when incest became a
popular topic. . . . The stories of Satanic abuse did not
begin until after she had observed the Geraldo Rivera televi­
sion special on Satanism."\1l While Coons and Grier present
only a single case study, they note that such cases "will prob­
ably become increasingly common as more victims of ritual
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abuse present for evaluation."112 Indeed, this may have been
the case in the 1990s. Because of the rapid proliferation of a
professional and popular literature on ritual abuse in the
1 980s and early 1990s, it could have been predicted that the
prevalence of factitious ritual abuse reports associated with
simulated MPD would dramatically increase by the early
1 990s. The Coons and Milstein data imply that by the late
1990s one out of every ten patients presenting to a specialty
inpatient unit for dissociative disorders and diagnosed as
MPD was likely to have simulated MPD. Given this remark­
able prevalence rate, it is noteworthy how difficult it has been
for clinicians to discriminate between simulated and genuine
MPD.
More recently, Ross developed a "four-pathway model" for
DID. According to this model, there are four independent
pathways contributing to the development of reported/mani­
fested alter personality behavior and the range of clinical fea­
tures characteristic of DID: ( 1 )  iatrogenic (created through
therapeutic suggestive influences), (2) factitious (self-gener­
ated by the patient motivated by the need to adopt a sick
role), (3) created by trauma and abuse, and (4) created by
neglect. Ross acknowledges that at least some of the more
dramatic and fantastic cases of DID may be factitious disor­
ders masquerading as DID-Le. , the simulation of DID
symptoms with no genuine alter behavior present.  H e  
observed that such patients have "no history of dissociative
symptoms prior to therapy, but there is usually an elaborate
medical-surgical history." He also noted that these patients
often "overfake" DID-for example, by getting extremely
high scores on the Dissociative Experiences Scale. Further­
more, Ross observed that the presentations of factitious DID
may have changed since the mid-1 990s. He raised questions
about possible factitious false memory syndrome, in which
the patient first factitiously alleges that a former therapist(s)
suggestively implanted the DID symptoms, and then retracts
the abuse history and sues the therapist(s) . According to
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398 FACTITIOUS DISORDERS & TRAUMA-RELATED DIAGNOSES
Ross, the current complex combination of primary and sec­
ondary gain derived from factitious false memory syndrome
allegations in the context of a lawsuit, and reinforced by the
media and by false memory lawyers and their experts, is typi­
cally far greater than the simple attention derived from adop­
tion of a sick role with the former defendant clinician(s).1 13
In our own experience with dozens of false memory cases,
those DID patients with very flamboyant histories should be
scrutinized for possible factitious DID. Draijer and Boon, in
this issue, are the first to investigate factitious DID empiri­
cally. Using a sensitive diagnostic instrument, the Structured
Clinical Interview for Diagnosis-Dissociative Disorders Ver­
sion (SCID-D), to carefully differentiate between genuine
and simulated DID, they developed a list of differential crite­
ria to distinguish between the two presentations. Hopefully,
based on sound empirical research of this type in the future,
clinicians will be in a better position to differentiate between
genuine and factitious DID presentations.
In our opinion, a major limitation of the pioneering work by
Coons, Kluft, Chu, Ross, and Draijer and Boon on factitious
DID is the either-or assumption inherent in some of this
work. These researchers have assumed that observed alter
personality behavior and other clinical features associated
with DID (e.g., disremembered experiences, time loss, etc.)
are either genuine or fabricated. In our view, except for Kluft
they have not adequately accounted for the possible co-exis­
tence of a genuine major dissociative disorder and a factitious
embellishment of this disorder. In our own research, involv­
ing careful examination of the medical records of dozens of
patients, we have found that the co-existence of a genuine
major dissociative disorder (DID or DDNOS) and factitious
embellishment of the dissociative condition is not infrequent,
at least in the 1 990s.
     
   
         
       
      
 
   
 
     
      
          
           
     
  
          
           
         
 
      
       
        
        
     
   
    
        
      
        
         
        
         
       
        
         
      
 
 
        
          
          
  
          
        
          
HeinOnline -- 27 J. Psychiatry & L. 399 1999
  
  
 
   
       
     
 
 
 
    
   
  
    
    
    
    
   
      
       
     
   
   
   
     
     
    
     
     
    
    
         
    
     
    
       
 
 
     
     
         
7. Complex cases: multiple co-morbidities involving
factitious and dissociative combinations
399 
In an important paper, Toth and Baggaley describe a single
case in which a chronic factitious disorder (Munchausen's
syndrome) and a genuine dissociative disorder (MPD/DID) 
co-existed in the same patient.1I4 This patient also had a co­
morbid borderline personality disorder diagnosis. The authors
trace the roots of the three conditions to a life-threatening ill­
ness that began when the patient was three years old and later
resulted in a 10-month hospitalization, a prolonged recovery
time, and an extended period of sexual and physical abuse by
a male babysitter and a brother that began around age 5. Dur­
ing the abuse, the patient learned to dissociate into an alter
personality who retained the abuse experiences compartmen­
talized from the host personality. The patient experienced
progressive time loss, beginning in the second grade. Into
adulthood she experienced an impressive total of 58 medical
hospitalizations, mainly for factitious physical symptoms
such as fabricated head injuries, fevers, infections, anemia,
and urinary tract infections. She had accumulated 13  surgical
interventions for fictitious symptoms. Toth and B aggaley
believe that the prolonged illness and recovery contributed to
the development of the factitious behavior on the one hand,
and the childhood abuse contributed to the development of
the dissociative disorder on the other hand. They add, "The
caring received during the original hospitalization was likely
a much-needed respite from the home atmosphere [of abuse]
and served to engender a life-long habit of attempting to
return to that haven [through feigning illness]."lIs While the
authors believe this case represents the co-existence of gen­
uine DID and factitious behavior, they also stipulate that it is
not entirely possible to rule out that the DID itself was
another factitious creation.1I6 
One other case of the possible co-existence of a factitious and
a dissociative disorder has been reported in the literature. 
One of three cases reported by Popli et al. concerned a
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400 FACTITIOUS DISORDERS & TRAUMA-RELATED DIAGNOSES
patient with voices, memory lapses, and seizures consistent
with a dissociative disorder diagnosis and also an uncorrobo­
rated, and possibly fabricated, history of childhood sexual
and physical abuse, allegedly by a stepfather. 117 Of course,
dissociative/factitious combinations can also involve genuine
and/or exaggerated suicidal and self-mutilatory behavior.
Such patients exaggerate self-destructive reports and behav­
iors in order to maintain the sick role and prolong hospital­
ization.1I8 Armstrong (this issue) presents a case report of a
woman treated for a major dissociative condition (DID) and a
self-reported trauma history who subsequently retracted both
her dissociative disorder diagnosis and her abuse history and
sued her therapists for allegedly implanting them. Armstrong
correctly emphasizes the factitious behavior throughout this
patient's history, co-existing with her presentation of disso­
ciative symptoms, although Armstrong is skeptical as to
whether this patient ever had genuine DID.
We recently conducted a study of 3 1  retractors who became
plaintiffs in high-profile malpractice suits. 1I9 Most of these
retractors had recovered memories of childhood sexual and/or
physical abuse, and then ritual abuse, that they reported to
their therapists. Some years after a typically amicable termi­
nation with the therapists, where the medical records usually
show substantial improvement with regard to the dissociative
disorder, these patients retracted the abuse memories and sub­
sequently sued their therapists for malpractice. They alleged
that the earlier abuse reports were the product of therapeutic
influences that caused false memories of abuse to be sugges­
tively implanted and resulted in a false DID diagnosis. In our
study, which we are completing for publication, we found,
from an examination of all of the available medical and legal
records, that each of these retractors exhibited genuine multi­
ple co-morbid psychiatric diagnoses. Over 70% of the retrac­
tors had a minimum of five major co-morbid psychiatric
diagnoses, which typically included (1) a major affective ill­
ness, (2) PTSD, (3) DID or DDNOS, (4) a mixed personality
or borderline personality disorder, and (5) one or more addic-
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tive behaviors, such as chemical dependence, an eating disor­
der, sexual compulsivity, or chronic self-mutilation. Addi­
tional diagnoses in some of these retractors included a
somatoforrn disorder and some kind of anxiety diagnosis.
In addition to these genuine multiple co-morbid diagnoses,
we also found that an impressive 33% of the sample met the
criteria for a factitious disorder co-existing with a major dis­
sociative disorder. These patients over several decades mani­
fested a complex pattern of factitious medical symptoms and
syndromes, factitious psychiatric conditions, and factitious
victimization reports. A history of chronic lying was usually
present. These cases are important in that they show that mul­
tiple combinations of genuine co-morbid psychiatric condi­
tions involving trauma-related diagnoses (PTSD and DID or
DDNOS) and Axis II personality disorder diagnoses some­
times co-exist with a chronic and progressive pattern of facti­
tious behavior, and later with malingered behavior in the
context of malpractice litigation.
The typical course of such complex cases is that the PTSD
and DID or DDNOS symptoms emerge progressively over
time, concurrent with progressively more embellished
accounts of abuse, beginning with childhood abuse and
neglect, and progressing to bizarre accounts of ritual abuse,
human sacrifice and cannibalism. The dramatic nature of
these ritual-abuse reports raises the index of suspicion about
factitious behavior. This is not to say that genuine childhood
abuse may not have been operative in the development of at
least some portion of the adult psychopathological symptoms
in at least some of these cases. Putting aside the historical
truth of abuse, however, these cases definitely show a pattern
of factitious distortion and embellishment of the abuse
reports. For example, whenever the patient reports being a
"high priestess" in a Satanic ritual abuse cult, combined with
a long history of highly variable medical and psychiatric
complaints, a significant factitious contribution to the overall
complex illness pattern must be suspected. In our opinion, the
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402 FACTITIOUS DISORDERS & TRAUMA-RELATED DIAGNOSES
motivation for these complex symptom presentations, along
with the fabricated and/or at least progressively embellished
personal abuse histories, is the need for attention from the
clinician. The DID patient with a bizarre and sensational cult
abuse story, who at one time alleged to be the "high priest" of
the cult, is much more likely to command the attention of the
therapist and/or the inpatient psychiatric nursing staff than
the DID patient with more common childhood abuse recollec­
tions.
Such complex cases leave us with the thorny problem of
apportioning the relative contribution of genuine mUltiple co­
morbid psychiatric diagnoses and factitious symptoms and
personal histories in the same patient. These cases illustrate
that in contrast to the data of Draijer and Boon reported in
this volume, the diagnosis of a major dissociative disorder
and a factitious disorder is sometimes not an either-or propo­
sition. Draijer and Boon's discussion of "flamboyant DID" is
their way of acknowledging that such dissociative/factitious
disorder combinations also have been observed in their exten­
sive research sample. Armstrong's case report in this issue
also leaves the reader with a question regarding the interrela­
tionship between genuine dissociative symptoms and facti­
tious behavior.
Furthermore, there is a complex relationship between facti­
tiousness and borderline behavior. As we have observed in
recanters, as the dissociative disorder is addressed and
improves in treatment, additional pressure to maintain the
sick role is placed on the factitious disorder and additional
pressure to blame others and have others run their lives is
placed on borderline disorder. Thus it is sometimes the suc­
cess of the treatment of the dissociation that invigorates facti­
tiousness and borderline behavior and establishes the
preconditions for a malpractice lawsuit.
At the time these patients presented, in the late 1 980s and
early 1 990s, the stories they told about severe abuse, cults,
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etc., were reinforced by the media. Therapists were therefore
less likely to see the factitious disorder element. Furthermore,
the professional literature did not describe factitious aspects
of co-morbid diagnoses, and the limited categories in DSM 
for factitious behavior would also have distracted well-mean­
ing healers from understanding these complex cases. The
great tragedy is that over the last decade, as therapists have
struggled to learn how to treat these cases, the courts have
been holding them liable based on a standard of care that did
not exist then and is only starting to become clearer now.
8. Developmental perspectives: neglect, attachment
pathology, and the learned development of
factitious behavior
Rogers et al. correctly criticize the DSM definition for its
lack of concern with the developmental pathology associated
with a factitious disorder:
[DSM-I/I] expresses a clear moral condemnation of this kind of
deceptive behavior. . . .  In DSM-III, the diagnosis of deception is
totally in the foreground, whereas the patient' s disturbed relation­
ship to his or her own body is entirely in the background . . . the
objective is to take on the role of patient . . . [what is neglected in
DSM-III is the] disturbed relationship to his or her own body, as 
well as the disturbed doctor-patient relationship.120 
We propose a three-factor model for the etiology of a facti­
tious disorder. First, the roots of factitious behavior can be
traced to an early pattern of neglect or deprivation, which
sensitizes the child to a need for attention. Second, through
incidental learning, the developing child and later adult
specifically learns that sick-role behavior can be used to elicit
care-giving responses from health professionals initially.
Third, the socio-cultural context and the type of information
available to the factitious disorder patient serve to shape the
specific type of factitious behavior, be it simulated physical
symptoms, simulated psychological symptoms, false victim-
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a. Neglect,
deprivation
& loss and
pervasive
develop­
mental
deficits
ization stories, or a combination thereof. We will now more
closely examine each of these factors.
There is a growing consensus that factitious disorders arise
from a "developmental disturbance" and that the relationships
factitious disorder patients develop with caregivers is a reen­
actment of past developmental disturbances. 121 The earliest
psychoanalytic descriptions of factitious behavior, originating
with Karl Abraham, stressed the "preoedipal deprivation"122
and "lack of parental affection" in the early childhood back­
grounds of these patients. In Spiro, for example, wrote:
Early childhood deprivation and difficult relationships with aloof,
absent, or sadistic parents may sensitize the latter patients to dis­
torted learning stemming from traumatic early illness or hospital­
i zation. The concept of mastery . . .  offers the most useful
explanation for the subsequent behavior.124 
Sometimes early loss, in addition to deprivation, contributes
to the development of factitious behavior. l25 Plassmann, for
example, sees factitious behavior as an "attempt to cope with
the early object losses in a narcissistic manner." In his sample
of 22 factitious disorder patients, 6 1  % had self-reported
attachment problems, 24% had rape histories, 19% had incest
histories, and 28% had suffered traumatic object loss . 126 
According to Nadelson, abnormal illness behavior arises
from fundamental problems in "attachment, bonding, and
caretaking."127 Those adult patients specifically presenting
with factitious PTSD "often have childhoods seriously lack­
ing in parental affection."128
These early experiences of neglect, deprivation and/or loss
result in pervasive developmental arrests along the lines of
relational, self, and affect development. Long-lasting impair­
ments in relational development or attachment pathology
(insecure attachment) 129 arise from the neglect and loss. In a
study of seven factitious patients, for example, Carlson
noted:
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Marked defects in interpersonal relationships due to the observed
primary illness may help to explain their disorder. . . . It is felt
that the major factor contributing to the production of factitious 
symptoms in these patients was a severe disturbance of interper­
sonal relationships produced by the patients' primary iIInesses.
. . . The fabrication of symptoms may serve as a mechanism
whereby these individuals can temporarily relate to others, over­
come their isolation, obtain caring, have certainty of their needs
being met, and possibly act out previous family dynamics.130 
Nicholson and Roberts have reached a similar conclusion. In
their view of the etiology of the factitious disorder:
A general picture emerges in which patients come from disturbed
families and reach adulthood with a severely impaired ability to
form relationships, lifelong experience of emotional deprivation
and diagnosable personality disorder. Fabrication of mental illness
may be motivated by a need to seek compensation from sick role
benefits and relationships with mental health professionals.131 
Another developmentally arrested line pertains to the sense of
self and the body self. An arrest in body image development
sensitizes the child to shifts in bodily states, and over time
the child learns to manipulate these states in the service of the
emerging factitious behavior:
. . . a pathology affecting the body self as well as a specific pathol­
ogy in the doctor-patient relationship . . . these patients often have
an intimate knowledge of the manner in which their bodies react
and are thus able to discover possibilities for manipulation with
which the physician is normally unfamiliar . . . good and evil parts
of body as representations of negative portions of self.132 
Arrested self and self-esteem development is a primary fea­
ture of factitious behavior. In an important empirical study of
1 8  factitious disorder patients, Ehlers and Plassmann found
that nine had a co-existing borderline personality disorder
diagnosis and six had a co-existing narcissistic personality
disorder diagnosis. They found that 83% of patients in the
sample showed significant evidence for "disorders of self­
regulation" and concluded: "The overwhelming majority of
patients suffering from factitious disorders therefore demon-
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406 FACTITIOUS DISORDERS & TRAUMA-RELATED DIAGNOSES
strate a narcissistic pathology."133 This failure in self develop­
ment results in several long-term consequences-an unstable,
protean sense of self and a vulnerability to self fragmenta­
tion. Such self pathology may serve to explain why the facti­
tious disorder patient can so easily assume very different
identities and personal histories over timel34 and why, funda­
mentally, the factitious disorder patient's identity is that of an
imposter. 135 Some experts have viewed factitious behavior as
an adaptive attempt to prevent total fragmentation of an
unstable sense of self by asserting and reinforcing false iden­
tities.136 
Affect development is also arrested in the factitious disorder
patient. According to Rodin, the factitious disorder patient's
preoccupation with bodily experience arises from a develop­
mental deficit in "emotional awareness."137 These patients
have considerable difficulty with affective experience and
tolerance. According to Spivak et aI., they show an "incapac­
ity to appraise what is real . . .  can't experience inner affect
states as real . . .  can't perceive emotion and perceptions as
real . . .  [and have] uncertainty about the validity and conti­
nuity of their own subjective experience.138 
A related developmental deficit occurs with respect to the
development of reality perception and reality testing. Spivak
et al. explain:
[The factitious disorder patient] may suffer from underlying distur­
bances in the sense of reality and in reality testing. These features
may be associated with a poorly consolidated sense of self and with
difficulty regarding emotional experience as real. Factitious behav­
ior may serve to stabilize the sense of self by concretizing and
legitimizing the subjective experience of distress and by evoking
responsiveness of a caregiver in a relatively safe, structured con­
text. . . . Two features that may be evident in patients with facti­
tious disorders, but that are not explicitly noted in the DSM-IlI-R,
are disturbances in the sense of self and in the sense of reality. 139
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This developmental arrest in reality testing makes it difficult
for the factitious disorder patient to determine what is and is
not real. Pathological lying, a common symptom in factitious
disorder patients, may simply be a reflection of the factitious
disorder patient's inability to distinguish what is a subjec­
tively created fabrication and what is objective reality. In this
sense, deceiving others may not be the primary intention of
the factitious disorder patient, but simply a by-product of a
fundamental inner confusion about what is real and what is
not. The description of abuse history and its later recantation
are similar instances of the inability to know what is reaL
b. Learning Most experts concur that the developing pattern of factitious
behavior begins as a learned adaptive strategy to cope with
deprivation, loss, and the subsequent arrests across develop­
mental lines. Early on in the process they learn to discern and
attempt to gain some control over internally shifting self­
states, shifting bodily and affective states, and over the vicis­
situdes of their connections to others and their reality sense.
Experience with childhood illnesses, especially if prolonged,
also contributes to the developing pattern. Factitious disorder
patients have been known to have an "early preoccupation
with health and i llness ." 14o Relations with health c are
providers in childhood are a critical factor in the developing
pattern, in that these patients learn that health care providers
readily give the kind of caring and nurturance that otherwise
are lacking. Cramer et al. say that "a central factor was the
relationship with physicians who had been important figures
in childhood." They add that it is perhaps no accident that a
good number of factitious disorder patients at one time or
another worked in the health field. As the direct recipients of
care-giving from health care providers or through observa­
tions of others who receive such care, those who eventually
develop a factitious pattern have learned to associate health
care providers with receiving the kind of nurturance and
attention they desire.141 
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c. The
sociocultural
context
In later childhood and adulthood, typically through contact ,
with the health care system, they learn that simulated behav­
ior consistently elicits care-giving responses from health care
providers. Once this association is firmly established through
incidental learning, they embark upon a progressively
learned, and ultimately compulsive, pattern of deceit and sim­
ulated behavior targeted specifically at health care providers.
The fundamental motivation is based upon a "longing for
nurturance"142 and a "desire to be at the center of interest and
attention."143 On account of their failure in reality testing, fac­
titious disorder patients usually show evidence of a long his­
tory of pathological lying andlor antisocial behavior by late
childhood and adolescence.l44 
Similar to addictive behaviors, such as alcoholism and drug
addiction, the learned factitious pattern eventually takes on a
life of its own-with progressive encroachment on the vari­
ous areas of everyday life functioning, and the development
of a set of rationalizations to justify a pattern of simulated
behavior that is, at this point, compulsive. Now the factitious
disorder patient must continue the cycle of deceit even in the
face of greater disruption of daily life and greater potential
risks.
Nadelson said: "All [factitious disorder patients] have learned
such behavior in a culture."145 In this culture, assuming a
"sick role" is a legitimate way to exempt oneself of daily
responsibilities and still be lovingly cared for. 146 Factitious
disorder patients learn that sick-role behavior directly grati­
fies their longings for secure attachment. However, the ever­
changing forms of factitious behavior also shift as popular
culture shifts. Popular culture in the 1 960s and 1 970s placed
the medical profession in high esteem, and it is perhaps no
accident that most of the case reports of that era were facti­
tious disorder with physical symptoms. Popular culture and
media exposure in the 1 980s concerned themselves with post­
traumatic stress disorder following the Vietnam War and with
the discovery of the prevalence and long-term effects of
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childhood abuse. Again, it is perhaps no accident that rela­
tively new forms of factitious illness were increasingly
reported in this era, such as factitious PTSD, factitious MPD,
and factitious victimization. The popular culture of the late
1 980s and early 1990s detailed gruesome accounts of severe
forms of abuse, such as extreme sadistic abuse and ritual
abuse. In this era, more complex forms of factitious illness
appeared, such as factitious DID and the co-existence of mul­
tiple co-morbid real psychiatric conditions involving combi­
nations of DID or DDNOS, a personality disorder, and
factitious embellishment of an alleged severe abuse history.
The popular culture of the mid-1 990s spread the idea of ther­
apeutically implanted false memories, and with that, facti­
tious retractor behavior increasingly found its way into the
courtroom. Based on these shifting socio-cultural trends,
Feldman and Ford recommend that clinicians "take social cli­
mates and world events into consideration" when evaluating
factitious presentations. 147 
9. Summary
• The core feature of factitious illness is a systematic pat­
tern of deceit and simulated behavior motivated by
attempts to adapt to developmental failures.
• The DSM assumptions about exclusionary criteria,
especially with respect to genuine Axis I diagnoses, are
inadequate. The DSM fails to address with sufficient
specificity the co-existence of genuine psychiatric disor­
ders and factitious behavior. Its criteria should explicitly
allow for the co-existence of a factitious disorder diagno­
sis with other genuine psychiatric conditions, or at least
use the category of factitious behavior in association with
genuine psychiatric conditions.
• By splitting hysteria asunder in DSM-III, the complex
interrelationship between dissociation disorders and facti-
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410  FACTITIOUS DISORDERS & TRAUMA-RELATED DIAGNOSES
tious disorders was lost. The current DSM definition fails
to account for cases in which genuine DID or DDNOS
co-exists with factitious behavior, and it fails to address
with necessary precision the issue of totally factitious
DID.
• The DSM conceptualization fails to show an appreciation
for the pervasive developmental deficits in attachment,
self, body-self, affect, and reality testing characteristic of
factitious behavior. These developmental deficits serve as
a plausible explanation for shifting self presentations,
manipulation and self-inflicted injury of the body, fabri­
cated histories, and abuse reports that are impossible to
verify as true or false, and all these deficits are for the
sake of eliciting care-giving from health providers by
means of elaborate deceptions.
• The forms of factitious disorder shift as the socio-cultural
context changes. In the 1 960s factitious illness was
observed with predominantly physical symptoms. In the
1 980s factitious illness with psychological symptoms
became increasingly prevalent. In the late 1 980s and
1 990s factitious victimization and personal histories, as 
well as complex forms of factitious conditions combining
factitious physical and psychiatric symptoms with facti­
tious personal histories and identities, with or within the
co-existence of genuine psychiatric conditions such as a
major dissociative disorder and a personality disorder,
were increasingly prevalent. The data that 10% of all
inpatients diagnosed with DID may be simulating DID,
and that 33% of patients diagnosed with genuine DID or
DDNOS may have significant factitious embellishment of
their symptoms and histories, are impressive, and such
data make a strong argument that both clinicians and
legal experts need to improve their skills for detecting
simulated DID.148
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41 1
• Diagnostic nomenclature must account for the increasing
prevalence of factitious personal histories and identities,
not just factitious symptoms.
• The interaction between popular culture exposure to, and
reports of, claims of extreme trauma and false memories
have given rise to complex factitious cases and factitious
retraction cases.
• More recently, factitious false memory syndrome and fac­
titious retractor behavior, either co-existing or not co­
existing with genuine DID or DDNOS, is becoming
increasingly prevalent. Factitious behavior is a more
plausible alternate explanation for plaintiff false memory
retraction lawsuits than the iatrogenesis explanation,
especially given the data that one out of ten inpatients
diagnosed with DID is simulating and one out of three
patients with genuine DID or DDNOS also has a signifi­
cant factitious symptom and fabricated/embellished per­
sonal history presentation. These complex and factitious
retraction cases increasingly are making their way into
the courts, where the great need for attention is com­
pounded by potential external monetary incentives. Here
factitious behavior and malingering may overlap. The
courts have been as ill-equipped to detect factitious
behavior as the clinics have been.
• All experts concur that factitious behavior, especially in
its psychological forms, is very difficult to detect.149 Clin­
icians are not, and should not be, trained to be detec­
tives, ISO and they rarely receive training in the highly
specialized areas of detecting malingering and deceit. The
entire foundation of the doctor-patient relationship is
based on the patient telling the truth about his or her
symptoms. The doctor's duty to provide care is most
effective when matched by the patient's duty to act in
good faith in accurately presenting symptoms and a
history.
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Notes 
• Factitious behavior is a pattern of systematic deception
that arises within the patient. The courts must develop an
increased sensitivity to the contribution that factitious and
borderline mental disorders, coupled with post-therapeu­
tic suggestive influences, have played in the filing of
false memory complaints against healers. The courts must
now determine the relative responsibility and duty the
doctor owes to the deceptive patient who enters the legal
system essentially saying "You are liable because you
believed me."
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Annals Int. Med. , 90:230-242, 1 979; M. B auer & F. B oegner,
"Neurological Syndromes in Factitious Disorder," J. Nerv. Ment.
Dis. , 1 84:28 1 -288, 1 996; Carlson, supra note 1 0; H.H. Dohn,
"Factitious Rape: A Case Report," Hillside J. Clin. Psychiatry,
8 : 224-23 1 ,  1 986;  Earle & Folks, supra note 1 8 ;  D.G. Folks,
"Munchausen's Syndrome and Other Factitious Disorders," Neurol.
CUn., 1 3 : 267-28 1 ,  1 995; Folks and Freeman, supra note 9; T.D.
Geracioti, C. Van Dyke, J. Mueller & E. Merrin, "The Onset of
Munchausen's Syndrome," Gen. Hosp. Psychiatry, 9:405-409, 1987;
Lazarus, supra note 66; T. Nadelson, "The Munchausen Spectrum:
Borderline Character Features," Gen. Hosp. Psychiatry, 1 0: 1 1 -1 7,
1 979; Nadelson, supra note 32; R. Ries, "DSM-III Differential
Diagnosis of Munchausen's Syndrome," J. Nerv. Mental Dis.,
1 68:629-632, 1 980; M.H. Stone, "Factitious Illness: Psychological
Findings and Treatment Recommendations," Bull. Menninger CUn., 
4 1 :239-254, 1 977.
69. "Associated psychiatric disturbances includes substance abuse,
psychogenic pain disorder, malingering, dysthymic disorder, and
borderline personality disorder." Sutherland & Rodin, supra note 1 0,
p. 392.
70. H.J. Freyberger & W. Schneider, "Diagnosis and Classification of
Factitious D i sorder with Operational D i agnostic Systems,"
Psychother. Psychosom., 62:27-29, 1994.
7 1 .  Kihlstrom, supra note 38. 
72. DSM-III-R, supra note 42.
73. I. Pilowsky, "A General Classifi cati on of Abnormal Illness
Behaviors," Brit. J. Med. Psychol., 5 1 : 1 3 1 - 1 37, 1 978.
  
   
 
 
    
  
    
  
    
   
  
  
      
 
 
 
   
  
 
  
  
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
   
 
  
  
   
  
  
   
  
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
    
  
  
 
   
  
    
 
  
 
 
  
 
    
 
 
    
  
 
  
 
      
  
 
    
  
 
  
    
  
   
   
 
  
   
 
 
     
 
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
 
   
  
  
 
  
   
  
  
 
 
   
 
   
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
   
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
        
 
     
    
       
   
     
         
         
       
        
    
      
    
        
          
    
      
              
    
           
          
        
          
          
             
          
        
      
       
   
  
             
          
          
          
        
         
       
              
  
4 1 8  FACTITIOUS DISORDERS & TRAUMA-RELATED DIAGNOSES
74. Caradoc-Davies, supra note 21,  p. 420.
75. Rogers et aI., supra note 30.
76. "Simulation does not appear to constitute a separate disorder but is
rather a symptom of a more fundamental problem such as personality
disorder." S.D. Nicholson & G.A. Roberts, "Patients Who (Need to)
Tell Stories," Brit. J. Hosp. Med. , 51 :546-549, 1994, p. 546.
77. Phillips, Ward & Ries, supra note 29.
78. L. Sparr & L . D .  Pankratz, "Factitious Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder," Am. J. Psychiatry, 140: 1016- 1 019, 1983, p. 1018.
79. L. Pankratz, "Continued Appearance of Factitious Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder," Am. J. Psychiatry, 147:8 1 2, 1990, p. 81 2.
80. E.J. Lynn & M. Belza, "Factitious Posttraumatic Stress Disorder:
The Veteran Who Never Got to Vietnam," Hosp. Comm. Psychiatry,
35:697-701 ,  1984, p. 701. 
8 1 .  Factitious (Vietnam) PTSD i s  discussed in one of the three cases in
Popli et aI., supra note 16, and in one of the three cases in Merrin et
aI., supra note 1 8.
82. See L.A. Neal & M.C. Rose, "Factitious Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder: A Case Report," Med. Sci. Law, 35:352-354, 1995, for a
single case of a 24-year-old man who claimed to be a victim of an
IRA bombing in Northern Ireland. A later review of the military and
medical records revealed that he couldn' t possibly have been present
at the bombing incident, although he had been in the military at the
time. His behavior was explained in terms of motivation to adopt a
sick role and be admired as a war hero.
83. M.D. Feldman, C.V. Ford & T. Stone, "Deceiving Others/Deceiving
Oneself: Four Cases of Factitious Rape," South. Med. J. , 87:736-738, 
1994, p. 736.
84. Id.
85. Dohn, supra note 68, discusses a single case of a 26-year-old woman
with factitious rape. She described two incidents but complained that
she couldn't remember much. She had superficial scratches on her
body, had a history of lying, and confessed to falsification under a
polygraph test. She had a borderline personality disorder diagnosis.
86. K.L. Gibbon, "Munchausen' s Syndrome Presenting as an Acute
Sexual Assault," Med. Sci. Law, 38:202-205, 1998.
87. See one of three cases about factitious rape in Merrin et aI., supra
note 1 8.
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419  
88. Feldman et aI., supra note 83, present cases of four women with
factitious rape (p. 736)
89. Falsifi ed accounts of physi cal abuse and neglect found i n  
J .  Goodwin, C.G. Cauthorne & R.T. Rada, "Cinderella Syndrome:
Children Who Simulate Neglect," Am. J. Psychiatry, 1 37: 1223-1225,
1980.
90. False accusation of assault by parents found in A. Feinstein & A. 
Hattersley, "Ganser Symptoms, Dissociation, and Dysprosody,"
J. Nerv. Ment. Dis., 1 76:692-693, 1988. 
91. For a single case report on false sexual abuse, see M. Matas &
A. Marriott, "The Girl Who Cried Wolf: Pseudologia Phantastica and
Sexual Abuse," Can. J. Psychiatry, 32:305-309, 1 987.
92. M . H .  Stone, "Factitious Illness: Psychological Findings and
Treatment Recommendations," Bull. Menninger Clinic, 4 1:239-254,
1 977, p. 244.
93. P.M. Coons and F. Grier, Factitious Disorder (Munchausen Type)
Involving Allegations of Ritual Satanic Abuse: A Case Report,"
Dissociation, 3: 1 77-178, 1990.
94. S. Feldman-Schorrig, "Factitious Sexual Harassment," Bull. Am.
Acad. Psychiatry Law, 24:387-392, 1996, p. 388. 
95. E. Rothchild, "Fictitious Twins, Factitious Illness," Psychiatry,
57:326-332, 1 994, describes five cases of patients hospitalized with
factitious disorder who described the fantasized loss of a fictional
twin.
96. Implied in Bursten's term "pseudologia fantastica," supra note 4.
97. Feldman-Schorrig, supra note 94. 
98. G.H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Interrogations. Confessions
and Testimony. New York: Wiley, 1 992.
99. M.L. Erickson, "Negation or Reversal of Legal Testimony," A rch.
Neurol. Psychiat. , 40:548-553, (September) 1 938. 
100. For example, factitious disorder with neurological symptoms
includes fainting, seizures, amnesia, headache, pain, tremor, and
hemiparesis (Bauer and Boegner, supra note 68); factitious epilepsy
associated with amnesia is reported in Jones & Horrocks, supra note
20. For additional discussion see 1. Goodwin, "Munchausen
Syndrome as a Dissociative Disorder," Dissociation. 1 :54-60, 1 988.
1 0 1 .  P . M . Coons, "Examples of Pseudomuitiplicity," Memos on
Multiplicity, 2:4-5, 1978.
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1 02. R.P. Kluft, "The S i mu lation and D i s simulation of Multiple
Personality Disorder," Am. J. of Clinical Hypnosis, 30: 104- 1 1 8,
1 987.
1 03.  J.A. Chu, "On the Misdiagnosis of Multiple Personality Disorder,"
Dissociation, 4:200-204, 199 1 ,  p. 202.
104. Id.
105. /d.
106. P.M. Coons and V. Milstein, "Factitious or Malingered Multiple
Personality Disorder: Eleven Cases," Dissociation, 7:81-85, 1994.
107. /d.
1 08. /d.
109. Id.
1 1 0. Coons and Grier, supra note 93.
1 1 1 . Id., p. 178.
1 12. Id.
1 1 3.  C.A. Ross, Dissociative Identity Disorder: Diagnosis, Clinical
Features, and Treatment of Multiple Personality. New York: Wiley,
1997, p. 68.
1 14. E.L. Toth, "Factitious Hypoglycemia and the Multiple Personality
Disorder," Annals Int. Med., 1 12:76, 1982; E.L. Toth & A. Baggaley,
"Coexistence of Munchausen Syndrome and Multiple Personality
Disorder: Detailed Report of a Case and Theoretical Discussion,"
Psychiatry, 54: 176- 1 83, 1991.  
1 1 5. Id., p.  179.
1 1 6. "An alternative explanation of our patients' manifestations would be
that the MPD is just one more form of factitious disorder created by
the patient, prompted perhaps by the recent increasing awareness of
this condition (MPD) in the lay and scientific press." Id., p. 1 8 1 .  
1 1 7. One o f  three cases discussed i n  Popli et al., supra note 16.
1 1 8. For discussions of suicidality in factitious patients, see Bhugra,
supra note 10; A. Cremona-Barbaro, "The Munchausen Syndrome
and Its Symbolic Significance: An In-depth Case Analysis," Brit. J.
Psychiat., 1 5 1 :76-79, 1 987; Eckhardt, supra note 20.
1 1 9. D. Brown, A.W. Scheflin and D.C. Hammond, "False Memory
Lawsuits: The Weight of the Scientific and Legal Evidence,"
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AAPL/APA Manfred S.  Guttmacher Award Lecture, American
Psychiatric Association Annual Convention, Washington, DC, May
16, 1999.
120. Rogers et aI., supra note 30.
121.  D . G. Folks, "Munchausen ' s  Syndrome and Other Factitious
Disorders," Neurol. Clin., 1 3:267-28 1 ,  1 995.
122. K. Abraham, "The History of an Imposter in the Light of
Psychoanalytic Knowledge," Psychoanal. Quart., 4:570-587, 1 935.
123. Also emphasized by Bursten, supra note 4, and Spiro, supra note 6. 
124. Spiro, supra note 6, p. 578.
1 25. Geracioti et aI., supra note 68. 
126. Plassmann, supra note 50, p. 9. 
127. Nadelson, supra note 32, p. 1 82.
128. Lynn & Belza, supra note 80, p. 701 .
1 29. M.D.S. Ainsworth, M.C. Blehar, E. Waters & S. Wall, Patterns of 
A ttachment: A Psychological Study of the Strange Situation.
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1 978.
130. Carlson, supra note 10, pp. 383, 387.
1 3 1 .  Nicholson & Roberts, supra note 76.
132. Plassmann, supra note 50, p. 9. 
133. W. Ehlers & R. Plassmann, "Diagnosis of Narcissistic Self-Esteem
Regulation in Patients with Factitious Illness (Munchausen),"
Psychother. Psychosom., 62:69-77, 1 994.
134. M.W.P. Carney & J.P. Brown, "Clinical Features and Motives
Among 42 Artifactual Illness Patients," Brit. J. Med. Psychol. ,
56:57-76, 1983.
135. Cramer et aI., supra note 3 1 .  
136. Id; Geracioti et aI., supra note 68. 
137. For a discussion of somatization as "a disturbance in the cohesion of
the self," see G.M. Rodin, "Somatization: A Perspective From Self
Psychology," J. Am. Acad. Psychoanal., 19:367-384, 1991, p. 3 8 1 .  
138. Spivak et aI., supra note 26, p .  27.
139. Id., pp. 25-27.
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140. Reich & Gottfried, supra note 8. 
141 .  Cramer et al., supra note 3 1 .  
142. Feldman & Escalona describe a case of factitious cancer based on a
"longing for nurturance," supra note 14, p. 226.
143. Folks & Freeman, supra note 9, p. 270.
144. Geracioti, supra note 68. 
145. Nadelson, supra note 32, p. 183.  
146. T. Parsons, The Social System. New York: Free Press, 195 1 .  
147. M . D .  Feldman and C.V. Ford, Patient o r Pretender: Inside the
Strange World of Factitious Disorders. New York: John Wiley,
1994, p. 142.
148. Coons and Milstein, supra note 106; Brown et aI., supra note 1 19. 
1 49. For example, Popli et aI., supra note 1 6, p. 3 1 7, say, "Not one of
our three patients was ever diagnosed as having factitious disorder
with psychologi cal symptoms despite repeated psychiatric
hospitalizations and outpatient care."
1 50. A.W. Scheflin, "Narrative Truth, Historical Truth and Forensic
Truth," in L. Lifson and R.I. Simon, The Mental Health Practitioner
and the Law: A Comprehensive Handbook. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1 998, pp. 299-328.
